We consider information sharing between traders who process different types of information, namely information on the value of a risky security or information on the volume of liquidity trading in this security. We intercept the traders as dual-capacity brokers on the floor of an Exchange.

We develop a model in which the speed of reaction to trading opportunities is endogenous. Traders face a trade-off between the benefit of being first to seize a profit opportunity and the cost of attention required to be first to seize this opportunity. The model provides an explanation for...

We develop a model in which limit order traders possess volatility information. We show that in this case the size of the bid ask spread is informative about future volatility. Moreover, if volatility information is in part private, we establish that (i) the size of the bid ask spread and (ii)...

We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on past transaction prices (the ticker). Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay. Hence, the level of...

We show that retail trading activity has a positive effect on the volatility of stock returns. To identify this effect, we use a reform of the French stock market that triggers a drop in retail trading activity by raising the relative cost of speculative trading for retail investors. The daily...

We show that a cross-listing allows a firm to make better investment decisions because it enhances stock price informativeness. This theory of cross-listings yield several predictions. In particular, it implies that the sensitivity of investment to stock prices should be larger for cross-listed...

We analyze the effect of concealing limit order traders' identities on market liquidity. First we develop a model in which limit order traders have asymmetric information on the true cost of limit order trading (which is determined by the exposure to informed trading). Uninformed bidders draw...

In many security markets, dealers trade with their regular clients at a discount relative to prevailing bid and ask quotes. In this article we provide an explanation to this phenomenon. We consider a dealer and an investor engaged in a long-term relationship. The dealer assigns a reputational...

We devel op a dynamic modelof anorder-drivenmarket populated bydiscretionary liquidity traders. These tradersmust trade, yet canchoose the type oforder and are fully strategic in their decision. Traders differ by their impatience: less patient traders are likely to demand liquidity, more patient...