We consider dynamic group formation in repeated n-person prisonerʼs dilemma. Agreements in coalitional bargaining are self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to renegotiate the cooperating group agreement through a process...

We consider the formation and long-run stability of cooperative groups in a social dilemma situation where the pursuit of individual interests conicts with the maximization of social welfare. The adaptive play model of Young (1993) is applied to a group formation game where voluntary...

In a 2 x2 symmetric game with two symmetric equilibria in pure strategies, one risk-dominates another if and only if the equilibrium strategy is a unique best response to any mixture that gives it at least a probability of one half. In a n x n symmetric game, we call a strategy globally...

Best response structure of n-person binary coordination games suggests that equilibrium selection outcome is determined by the balance of the ordinal aspects and the cardinal aspects of the game. This intuition inspires new equilibrium selection results for that class of games under the adaptive...