Executive compensation of 755 Canadian firms is examined over the period 1991-95, and evidence is obtained consistent with previous studies: CEO pay rises with firm size and compensation is tied to company performance. In addition, executives in utilities earn lower pay, and their compensation...

An obstacle to the teaching of principal-agent theory is the technical complexity and intractability of the general model. Even in academic studies strong assumptions are often imposed so as to derive an analytical solution. The author describes a graphical approach to the standard...

An obstacle to the teaching of principal-agent theory is the technical complexity and intractability of the general model. Even in academic studies strong assumptions are often imposed so as to derive an analytical solution. The author describes a graphical approach to the standard...

International studies document strong evidence that chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration is positively correlated with corporate performance. Prior Australian studies, however, find no positive link between CEO pay and market performance. In the present paper we re-examine the association...

Performance thresholds are commonly used in executive compensation contracts. We examine the contractual nonlinearity associated with performance thresholds and its incentive implications. Incorporating a performance threshold into a standard principal-agent model of a linear contract, we show...