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Managers wish to motivate workers to exert effort. There is large literature on the use of wages and monetary incentives for this purpose, but in practice the “honor” or “prestige” of an award can be a significant motivator as well, unless the award is given so often that its prestige is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847582
Managers wish to motivate workers to exert effort. There is large literature on the use of wages and monetary incentives for this purpose, but in practice the “honor” or “prestige” of an award can be a significant motivator as well, unless the award is given so often that its prestige is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999632
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006605105
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This paper presents a dynamic game model of international terrorism. The time horizon is finite, about the size of one presidency, or infinite. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of incentive Stackelberg strategies for both decision-makers of the game (“The West” and “International...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009441058
This paper presents a dynamic game model of international terrorism. The time horizon is finite, about the size of one presidency, or infinite. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of incentive Stackelberg strategies for both decision-makers of the game (“The West” and “International...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009441236
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371753
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