We analyze the incentives of a controlling shareholder of a firm to acquire, directly or indirectly through his firm, shares in a competitor. We charaterize the conditions under which these partial acquisitions are profitable for this dominant shareholder as well as the equilibrium toehold and...

We analyze the incentives for a controlling shareholder to acquire silent or controlling shares in a competitor. When it occurs, the acquisition is detrimental to minority shareholders of his firm, or to the target, or even to both. The ownership structure of firms turns out to be a key...

In this article, we analyze the characteristics of legal thresholds crossings in France during the years 2001 through 2003. Our data set created using the publications of the financial authorities and economic and financial data from Bloomberg comprises a total of 2.396 operations and displays a...

In a model a la Baron and Myerson (1982), we revisit the question of regulating a firm under asymmetric information concerning the production cost when the principal has access to a costly monitoring procedure. Our analysis gives quite different results from the existing literature. We show that...

We study horizontal partial acquisitions in an oligopolistic industry in the absence of synergies.Contrary to existing results, we …nd that a dominant shareholder may choose to acquire sharesin a competitor although the aggregate pro…t of the group of …rms under his control, and eventhe...