We introduce the class of Obligation Rules for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Situations. The main result of this paper is that such rules are cost monotonic and induce also population monotonic allocation schemes. Another characteristic of Obligation Rules is that they assign to a minimum cost...

This note characterizes ordinal potential games by the absence of weak improvement cycles and an order condition on the strategy space.This order condition is automatically satisfied if the strategy space is countable.

Norde et al.[Games Econ.Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent.A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a...

The function that assigns to each matrix game (i.e., the mixed extension of a finite zero-sum two-player game) its value is axiomatized by a number of intuitive properties.

Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from recent choices. More recent choices can be more salient than other choices, or more readily available in the agent's mind. Alternatively, agents may have formed...