In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium, if the electorate is large. Moreover, we show that there is an effect of sincere voters'...

In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium,if the electorate is large.

Using the spatial theory of voting, this paper describes an institutional structure where there are two branches of the government: the executive, elected by plurality rule, and the legislative elected by proportional rule. The resulting policy outcome is described through a compromise between...

In this paper we show that in a simple spacital model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if The outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficients equal to their share of seats, only a two-party voting equilibrium basically exists. The...

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus...

Constitutional structures shape politicians' behaviour and hence policy outcomes through the different incentive schemes at work. In this paper we analyse these mechanisms in parliamentary and presidential systems. Such a comparison is carried over by analysing how the two systems are able to...

We present a simple voting environment with three candidates where the Condorcet winner exists. Under plurality rule, the derived game has a stable set where such a candidate is elected with probability one. However, no stable set of the approval game elects the Condorcet winner with positive...

We present a model where a society elects candidates belonging to two parties to a national parliament. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. The policy outcome is a function of the number of seats the two parties win in the election. We analyze two...