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We introduce a model of communication with dynamic state of nature. We rely on entropy as a measure of information, characterize the set of expected empirical distributions that are achievable. We present applications to games with and without common interests.Classification JEL : C61, C73, D82.
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We study a repeated game in which one player, the prophet, acquires more information than another player, the follower, about the play that is going to be played. We characterize the optimal amount of information that can be transmitted online by the prophet to the follower, and provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752802
We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752839
We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130087
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We consider the "and" communication mechanism that inputs messages from two players and outputs the public signal "yes" if both messages are "yes", and outputs "no" otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented through finite or infinite repetition of this mechanism.
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