We focus on adverse selection as a foundation of group lending. In a simple static model we show that there is no collateral effect if borrowers do not know each other. If the borrowers know each other, group lending implements efficient lending. However, it is not robust to collusive behavior,...

This paper examines the impact of a self-interested bureaucracy on health care coverage in a poor country such as Côte d'Ivoire. Even when information about cost of care is available to all parties, the paper shows that only a fraction of the sick population receives adequate treatment for...

We consider a principal-multiagent framework with adverse selection when contracting is possible ex ante. However, enforcement of contracts is imperfect, which results in inefficiencies. We study how group contracting may or may not mitigate those inefficiencies.

[eng] A bureautic model of central bank behavior : the case of BCEAO . . Traditional monetary theories consider that central banks set their monetary policy with the sole objective of achievement public interest.. By relying upon the theory of the bureaucracy, this article sustains that the...