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We examine price formation in a simple static model with asymmetric information, an infinite number of risk neutral traders and no noise traders. Here we re-examine four results associated with rational expectations models relating to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium prices, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012789729
We show existence of equilibria in istributional strategies for a wide class of private value auctions, including the first general existence result for double auctions. The set of quilibria is invariant to the tie-breaking rule. The model incorporates multiple unit demands, all standard pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005482216
We consider discontinuous games with incomplete information. Auctions are a leading example. With standard tie breaking rules (or more generally, sharing rules), these games may not have equilibria. We consider sharing rules that depend on the private information of players. We show that there...
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We show existence of equilibria in distributional strategies for a wide class of private value auctions, including the first general existence result for double auctions. The set of equilibria is invariant to the tie-breaking rule. The model incorporates multiple unit demands, all standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005333039
This paper offers a new approach to the study of economic problems usually modeled as games of incomplete information with discontinuous payoffs. Typically, the discontinuities arise from indeterminacies (ties) in the underlying problem. The point of view taken here is that the tie-breaking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702017
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We study procurement auctions in which, as is common in practice, a group of sellers (incumbents, qualified bidders) is given an advantage, based, for example, on better reliability, quality, or incumbency status. We show conditions under which for any given first price handicap auction, there...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993388