In the social learning model of Banerjee [1] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] individuals take actions sequentially after observing the history of actions taken by the predecessors and an informative private signal. If the state of the world is changing stochastically over time during...

the efficient equilibrium to an operations research question.

We study the design of optimal incentives in a two-player dynamic contest. Two players continuously spend costly effort to attain a score lead, which is also affected by noise. The first player to reach a predetermined score difference (finish line) wins a prize. We focus on the choice of the...

This paper introduces a general model of matching that includes evolving public Bayesian reputations and stochastic production. Despite productive complementarity, assortative matching robustly fails for high discount factors, unlike in <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="R3">Becker (1973)</xref>. This failure holds around the highest...

The timing of elections is flexible in many countries. We study this optimization by first creating a Bayesian learning model of a mean-reverting political support process. We then explore optimal electoral timing, modelling it as a renewable American option with interacting waiting and stopping...