Using the integer programming approach introduced by Sethura- man, Teo, and Vohra (2003), we extend the analysis of the preference domains containing an inseparable ordered pair, initiated by Kalai and Ritz (1978). We show that these domains admit not only Ar- rovian social welfare functions...

In the line opened by Kalai and Muller (1977), we explore new con- ditions on preference domains which make it possible to avoid Arrow's impossibility result. In our main theorem, we provide a complete char- acterization of the domains admitting nondictatorial Arrovian social welfare functions...

In this paper, we reconstruct the main developments of the theory of noncooperative oligopoly in general equilibrium, by focusing on the analysis of three prototypical models for pure exchange economies: the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991); the model of...

In this paper, in an exchange economy with atoms and an atomless part, we analyze the relationship between the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of a strategic market game and the set of the Walras equilibrium allocations of the exchange economy with which it is associated. In an...

In this paper, we consider an exchange economy `a la Shitovitz (1973), with atoms and an atomless set. We associate with it a strategic market game of the kind first proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley and known as the Shapley window model. We analyze the relationship between the set of the...

In this paper, we consider an exchange economy µa la Shitovitz (1973), with atoms and an atomless set. We associate with it a strategic market game of the kind first proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley and known as the Shapley window model. We analyze the relationship between the set of the...

In this paper, in an exchange economy with atoms and an atomless part, we analyze the relationship between the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of a strategic market game and the set of the Walras equilibrium allocations of the exchange economy with which it is associated. In an...

Following Sethuraman, Teo and Vohra ((2003), (2006)), we apply integer programming tools to the analysis of fundamental issues in social choice theory. We generalize Sethuraman et al.'s approach specifying integer programs in which variables are allowed to assume values in the set {0; 1/2 ; 1}....