We study a model that involves identity-dependent, asymmetric negative external effects. Willingness to pay, which can be computed only in equilibrium, will reflect, besides private valuations, also preemptive incentives stemming from the desire to minimize the negative externalities. We find...

We examine a comprehensive set of public firms' issues of private and public debt, convertibles and common equity securities. The market for public firms issuing private securities is large. Of the over 13,000 issues we examine, more than half are in the private market, with 81\% of small public...

This paper identifies a new corporate governance mechanism: sharing control. We show that bargaining problems among multiple controlling shareholders may prevent inefficient investment decisions that harm minority shareholders. The same bargaining problems may block efficient investment...

This paper develops a dynamic model of tender offers in which there is trading on the target's shares during the takeover, and bidders can freeze out target shareholders (compulsorily acquire remaining shares not tendered at the bid price), features that prevail on almost all takeovers. We show...

We study the problem of going public in the presence of moral hazard, adverse selection and multiple trading periods. In the multi-period game managers strategically choose the level of extraction of private benefits and can develop a good reputation for expropriating low levels of private...

We examine public firms' issues of private and public debt, convertibles, and common equity securities. The market for public firms issuing private securities is large. Of the over 13,000 issues we examine, more than half are in the private market. We find that asymmetric information plays a...

We empirically investigate the effects of the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000. This rule was intended to stop the practice of selective disclosure, in which companies give material information only to a few analysts...

This paper addresses the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This problem is common among public firms in many countries where the legal system does not effectively protect minority shareholders against oppression by controlling shareholders. We show that...