We consider a setting in which two players must take a single action. The analysis is done within a private values model in which (i) the players’ preferences over actions are private information, (ii) utility is quadratic (non-transferable), (iii) implementation is bayesian and (iv) the...

We study the interaction between dispersed and sticky information by assuming that firms receive private noisy signals about the state in an otherwise standard model of price setting with sticky-information. We compute the unique equilibrium of the game induced by the firms' pricing decisions...

Diversification through a financial intermediary has the benefit of transforming loans that need costly monitoring into bank deposits that do not. We show that financial intermediation in a costly state verification model has a cost not yet analyzed: it allows for the existence of multiple...

This paper considers the problem faced by two regulators in providing incentives to a common (privately informed) regulated firm under various degrees of coordination. In the model, the firm exerts effort toward cost reduction and self-dealing, and incentives can be input-based (monitoring) and...

This paper compares the effects on corporate performance and managerial self-dealing in a situation in which a (privately informed) CEO reports to a single Board that is responsible for both monitoring management and establishing performance targets to an alternative in which the CEO reports to...

This paper considers the problem faced by n agents who repeatedly have to take a joint action, cannot resort to side payments, and each period are privately informed about their favorite actions. We study the properties of the optimal contract in this environment. We establish that first best...

This paper shows that, in comparison to a single-regulator arrangement, when an agent reports to two regulators, he is confronted with more powerful ex-post incentives. This generates, from an ex-ante perspective, higher incentives for relationship-specific investment.