We examine price formation in a simple static model with asymmetric information, an infinite number of risk neutral traders and no noise traders. Here we re-examine four results associated with rational expectations models relating to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium prices, the...

The following is a three-player litigation model. Previous litigation models analyze the litigation process as a two-player strategic game of incomplete information, where equilibrium usually involves a positive probability of trial. These litigation models assume the attorney and her client...

We prove existence of equilibria in bipartite social games, where players choose both a strategy in a game and a partner with whom to play the game. Such social games generalize the well-known marriage problem where players choose partners but do not take actions subsequent to matching.

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, such that players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new...