Showing 1 - 10 of 332
We examine whether the central bank council of a monetary union should publish its voting records when members are appointed by national politicians. We show that the publication of voting records lowers overall welfare if the private benefits of holding office are sufficiently low. High private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012735197
In this paper, we argue for a regulatory framework under which a bank's required level of equity capital depends on the equity capital of its peers. Such banking-on-the-average rules are transparent and could also be combined with the current regulatory framework. In addition, we argue that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012718256
We examine whether it is sufficient for central banks to observe and forecast nominal variables only. Analyzing the interplay of wage-setting unions and a central bank we show that although central banks may not gain more information by directly acquiring data about indicators of real shocks in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005530350
This Paper compares the social efficiency of monetary targeting and inflation targeting when central banks may have private information on shocks to money demand and, because of verifiability problems, the transparency solution is not feasible. Under inflation targeting and monetary targeting,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497735
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005425238
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369514
We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inflation forecast contracts, which make central bankers׳ remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011077523
We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inflation forecast contracts, which make central bankers’ remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084494
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010839775
Tax schemes are more restricted by constitutional rules than subsidies. We introduce a model of public good provision with incentive problems in agenda-setting and identify several advantages of restrictions on tax schemes. In particular, tax rules may prevent the proposal and adoption of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010998944