A well known result in the tax competition literature is that tax rates are set too low in the Nash equilibrium to finance an efficient level of public consumption goods. In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in...

A multinational firm sets the price that applies to intra- firm trade between the firm=A5s affiliates at a central level, but delegates decisions about national prices (or quantities) to national affiliates. When these affiliates encounter competition, it is shown that delegation of authority...

This paper attempts to analyze how the government from a social point of view should handle firms that demand preferential tax treatment on grounds of being internationally mobile. A revelation mechanism is constructed taking into account that migration decisions by firms have negative fiscal...

We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full...

This paper uses the Bad News Principle to study how the ability of multinationals to shift profits by transfer pricing affects both the timing of foreign direct investment decisions and government tax policy. A main finding of the paper is that if countries compete to attract foreign direct...

The paper employs a standard model of dynamic price competition to study how international principles of value-added taxation affect the stability of collusive agreements when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into each other's home market. If costs of production are...