This article extends the pairwise difference estimators for various semilinear limited dependent variable models proposed by Honoré and Powell ("Identification and Inference in Econometric Models". "Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg" Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) to permit the...

This paper contributes to the literature on econometric estimation of incomplete information games with Nash equilibrium behavior by introducing a two-step estimation procedure that makes no parametric assumptions about the distribution of unobservable payoffs shocks. Instead, its asymptotic...

We examine the identification power that (Nash) equilibrium assumptions play in conducting inference about parameters in some simple games. We focus on three static games in which we drop the Nash equilibrium assumption and instead use rationalizability as the basis for strategic play. The first...

This paper studies the problem of estimating the normal-form payoff parameters of a simultaneous, discrete game where the realization of such payoffs is not common knowledge. The paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, by making a comparison with the complete information...

We study econometric models of complete information games with ordered action spaces, such as the number of store fronts operated in a market by a firm, or the daily number of flights on a city-pair offered by an airline. The model generalises single agent models such as ordered probit and logit...