Properties can be bought by government agencies, land trusts, or private entities for conservation and preservation purposes, such as farmland preservation, wildlife refuges, other conservation, and cultural and historical preservation. There is variation in the dollars paid per acre across...

Stigma is a negative attribute of real estate acquired by the discovery of contamination and reflected in its value (Elliot-Jones, 1996). Using a theoretical model with external economies and adjustment costs, we show that both temporary stigma and permanent stigma are possible equilibrium...

Properties can be bought by government agencies, land trusts, or private entities for conservation and preservation purposes, such as farmland preservation, wildlife refuges, other conservation, and cultural and historical preservation. There is variation in the dollars paid per acre across...

This study uses a travel-cost model to analyse the attendance impacts on Major League Baseball (MLB) of the closest substitute MLB team. It is found that the closer two teams are, the lower attendance is at each team relative to two teams that are farther apart. In addition, when a new team...

This paper analyzes the financial incentives for entities to self-impose punishments post-apprehension but before the enforcement body imposes punishment. We argue that violators punish themselves in order to affect the level and type of total punishment. Violators may be able to choose the...

We estimate seasonal oligopoly power at a disaggregated variety level in the D'Anjou pear market. Our data spans 1993 to 2000, during which time imported pears became more prevalent in the U.S. market. The range of monthly industry-conduct-parameter magnitudes is 0.034 to 0.195 and is most...

There has been a great deal of recent growth in the area of private food quality standards. This article analyses the incentives for setting private quality standards before governments do so. Since food quality standards are generally multifaceted, different types of standards will affect...

Firms who sell regional or specialty products often share a collective reputation based on aggregate quality. Collective reputation can be approached as a dynamic common property resource problem. We show that for an experience good without firm traceability, individual firms have the incentive...

Firms who sell regional or specialty products often share a collective reputation based on aggregate quality. Collective reputation can be approached as a dynamic common property resource problem. We show that for an experience good without firm traceability, individual firms have the incentive...