<heading id="h1" level="1" implicit="yes" format="display">ABSTRACT</heading>Implicit employment contracts are a common way to motivate firm productivity but also require that employees trust management to be fair when allocating postproduction firm resources between employees and owners. We use an experiment to study the problem of motivating firm productivity,...

Implicit employment contracts are a common way to motivate firm productivity but also require that employees trust management to be fair when allocating post-production firm resources between employees and owners. We use an experiment to study the problem of motivating firm productivity, which...

We investigate how the budget levels embedded in budget-based contracts affect individual effort and risk-taking. We show that, from a wealth maximization perspective, a tradeoff exists between motivating effort and encouraging risk-taking. We illustrate an inverted-U relation between budget...

<heading id="h1" level="1" implicit="yes" format="display">ABSTRACT</heading>We examine how worker productivity differs when compensation is based on quantity, creativity, or the product of both measures. In an experiment in which participants design "rebus puzzles," we find that combining quantity and creativity measures in a creativity-weighted pay scheme...

<heading id="h1" level="1" implicit="yes" format="display">ABSTRACT</heading>This paper investigates the effects of preferences on judgments in an investing context, where investors should be motivated to interpret information objectively, yet have clear preferences with respect to what the information they are evaluating conveys (i.e., a gain or a loss on their...