Showing 1 - 10 of 624
Two sellers engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either seller to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who consume the same good. For a generic specification of consumption externalities, we show that an equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815173
A principal acquires information about a shock and then discloses it to an agent. After the disclosure, the principal and agent each decide whether to take costly preparatory actions that yield mutual benefits but only when the shock strikes. The principal maximizes his expected payoff by ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815175
Two sellers engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either seller to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who consume the same good. For a generic specification of consumption externalities, we show that an equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815180
This paper studies dynamic price competition over two periods between two firms selling differentiated durable goods to two buyers who are privately informed about their types, but have valuations of the two goods dependent on the other buyer's type. The firms' pricing strategy in period 1 must...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010797642
A monopolist sells a good whose value depends on the number of buyers who adopt it as well as on their private types. The seller coordinates the buyersʼ adoption decisions based on their reported types, and charges them the price based on the number of adoptions. We study ex post implementable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049855
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010960618
A principal acquires information about a shock and then discloses it to an agent. After the disclosure, the principal and agent each decide whether to take costly preparatory actions that yield mutual benefits but only when the shock strikes. The principal maximizes his expected payoff by ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931180
This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the implications of the theory of repeated games on equilibrium payoffs and estimate strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring. We find that subjects' payoffs (i) decrease as noise increases, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005005893
This paper studies repeated games with imperfect private monitoring when there exists a third-party mediator who coordinates play by giving non-binding instructions to players on which action to take and by collecting their private information. The paper presents a Nash-threat folk theorem for a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753240
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005117605