In the past, the study of international trade often focused on differences in labor, land and capital, as well as the distance between trading partners. But economists are increasingly looking at the role played by institutions, specifically those that enforce contracts and curb corruption.

This paper analyzes the issues of immigration and outsourcing in a general-equilibrium model of international factor mobility. In our model, legal immigration is controlled through a quota, while outsourcing is determined both by the firms (in response to market conditions) and through...

With outsourcing comes a perceived tension between the competitive pressures faced by domestic firms and the effect that outsourcing has on domestic workers. To address this tension, we present a general-equilibrium model with an oligopolistic export sector and a competitive import-competing...

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of enforcement in controlling illegal immigration in two scenarios, capital mobility and capital immobility in the host nation (for illegal immigrants). The source nation is assumed throughout to have immobility of capital. We show that the net enforcement...

Using the Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson–Vanek (HOSV) framework, this paper illustrates a relationship between corruption and the pattern of international trade that depends on the factor endowments of countries. The relationship between trade openness and corruption is empirically investigated...

Using cross-country time series data for 133 countries between 1984 and 2010, and implementing a fixed effects Poisson estimator using the gravity model of trade, we study the interaction between domestic and partner-country corruption and the treatment effect of a country joining the GATT-WTO...

This paper investigates the effect of corruption on trade openness in low-income and high-income countries. The results suggest corruption is anti-labor, since it reduces trade in low-income countries and increases trade in high-income countries.