In this paper we seek to provide a resolution of the Edgeworth paradox for the case where firms are free to supply less than the quantity demanded, the residual demand function is {\it manipulable} (a generalization of the proportional one) and prices vary over a grid. We demonstrate that a...

This paper develops a simple dynamic framework of holdout in land acquisition (both with and without political intervention), where holdout arises because of the landowners' inability to manage large sums of money (and consequent lack of inter-temporal consumption smoothing in case of sale). We...

In this paper we analyze the effect of income inequality on market outcome and hence the welfare of the consumer in the industry which is both horizontally and vertically differentiated. The idea is that any income distribution over the spatial horizon is reflected in the demand structure and...

We develop a tractable model of competition among motivated MFIs. We find that equilibria may or may not involve double-dipping (and consequently default), with there being double-dipping whenever the MFIs are very profit-oriented. Moreover, in an equilibrium with double-dipping, borrowers who...

In a scenario where terrorist organizations, based in an LDC, target a rich nation, we examine a joint, multi-pronged and dynamic counter-terror strategy and the role that developmental aid plays in its success. We show that aid-tying leads to a fruitful virtuous cycle whereby joint...

We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with increasing returns to scale where one of the firms have a cost advantage and prices vary over a grid. We find that typically more than one equilibria exist. However, there are only two perfect equilibria. Moreover, as the size of the grid becomes small,...

This paper develops a theory of sequential lending in groups in micro-finance that centers on the notion of dynamic incentives, in particular the simple idea that default incentives should be relatively uniformly distributed across time. In a framework that allows project returns to accrue over...

This paper develops a theory of sequential lending in groups in micro-finance that centers on the notion of dynamic incentives, in particular the simple idea that default incentives should be relatively uniformly distributed across time. In a framework that allows project returns to accrue over...