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Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to access actors‚ influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984921
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It has often been claimed that the current allocation of votes among EU states is not fair. In this paper, the authors verify this assertion by carrying out an evaluation of the distribution of power among the member states. The results show that the current distribution of votes for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005674613
The European Union decision-making process involves three main actors : the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the Parliament. Depending on the issue which is voted upon, there are three possible procedures to make a decision. These are : the proposal procedure, the cooperation procedure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985026
The aim of this paper is to determine the representation of parties in a Parliament that guarantees an equal representation of all the citizens. This problem is illustrated in the Israeli Knesset.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985300
In this paper we propose a simple model for measuring ‘success’ or ‘decisiveness’ in voting situations. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting rule and the voters’ behavior. The voting rule specifies when a proposal is to be accepted or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369440
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In this paper we explore the noncooperative foundations of the bargaining power that a voting rule gives to each member of a committee that bargains in search of consensus over a set of feasible agreements under a voting rule. Assuming complete information, we model a variety of bargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408682
In a recent paper, we provide an interpretation of the Shapley-Shubik index as a measure of the 'bargaining power' that a voting rule gives to each member of a committee negotiating in search of consensus. It is assumed that negotiation takes place under the condition that every winning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005409325
This paper deals with electing candidates. In elections voters are frequently offered a small set of actions (voting in favor of one candidate, voting blank, spoiling the ballot, and not showing up). Thus voters can express neither a negative opinion nor an opinion on more than one candidate....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108684