We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairto a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well wise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible...

We study a sequential bargaining game with a deadline from which the size of the cake decays. Two bargaining procedures are considered: a model with alternating-offers and a model with iterated simultaneous demands. We show that the bargaining game with alternating-offers has a unique SPE...

In this paper, I discriminate among alternative models of bargaining for wages and employment (right-to-manage, efficient bargaining and general bargaining models) using Belgian aggregate data. I estimate the ECM representation of a dynamic employment equation for each model using...

We develop a model of wage determination with private information in an unionized oligopolistic industry and we use it to compare the outcome of collective bargaining under two different bargaining structures- one in which a single wage is bargained at the industry-level and one in which the...