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In view of the uncertainty over the ability of merging firms to achieve efficiency gains, we model the post-merger situation as a Cournot oligopoly wherein the outsiders face uncertainty about the merged entity's final cost. At the Bayesian equilibrium, a bilateral merger is profitable provided...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008456
In view of the uncertainty over the ability of merging firms to achieve efficiency gains, we model the post-merger situation as a Cournot oligopoly wherein the outsiders face uncertainty about the merged entity's final cost. At the Bayesian equilibrium, a bilateral merger is profitable provided...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012738267
In view of the uncertainty over the ability of merging firms to achieve efficiency gains, we model the post-merger situation as a Cournot oligopoly wherein the outsiders face uncertainty about the merged entity's final cost. At the Bayesian equilibrium, a bilateral merger is profitable provided...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005499854
We investigate how rational individuals partition themselves into different coalitions in “hedonic games” (see Banerjee et al. 2001 and Bogomolnaia and Jackson 2002), where individuals' preferences depend solely on the composition of the coalition they belong to. Given that the four solution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369374
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005409259
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006887491
In view of the uncertainty over the ability of merging firms to achieve efficiency gains, we model the post-merger situation as a Cournot oligopoly wherein the outsiders face uncertainty about the merged entity’s final cost. At the Bayesian equilibrium, a bilateral merger is profitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808002
This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005811981
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146114
We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547233