In the present paper, an optimal growth model for which transformation possibilities are supposed to be bounded in the short run and unbounded in the long run - maybe due to adjustment costs or accummulation costs - is considered. It is shown that equilibria exist and that equilibrium...

This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a family of so-called efficient maxmin solutions which can be seen as generalizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to nonconvex n-person bargaining problems. Moreover, it is shown that even though there are several efficient maxmin...

In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear-quadratic setup we show that the...

In the present paper we consider the allocation of costs in connection networks. Agents have connection demands in form of pairs of locations they want to have connected. Connections between locations are costly to build. The problem is to allocate costs of networks satisfying all connection...

In this paper we consider a family of cost allocation rules for which agents pay a share of their incremental cost as well as of any ‘debt’ from prior agents. This family encompasses the Bird rule and the free riding rule (where terminal agents pay everything) as the two extreme cases. By...

In the present paper, we are concerned with the behavioural consequences of consumers having nontransitive preference relations. Data sets consist of finitely many observations of price vectors and consumption bundles. A preference relation rationalizes a data set provided that for every...

We study internalization of production externalities in perfectly competitive markets where production plans are decided by majority voting. Since shareholders want firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits, they are interested in some internalization. Two governances, namely...

This article provides a study of corporate control in a general equilibrium framework for production economies. When markets are incomplete, trading assets does not allow agents to fully resolve their conflict of interest: at the market equilibrium, shareholders disagree on the way to evaluate...

A general equilibrium model with uncertainty and production externalities is studied. In absence of markets for externalities, we look for governances and conditions under which majority voting among shareholders is likely to give rise to efficient internalization. We argue that the financial...