We consider tax competition in a world with tax bases exhibiting different degrees of mobility, modeled as mobile and immobile capital. An agreement among countries not to give preferential treatment to mobile capital results in an equilibrium where mobile capital is nevertheless taxed...

We consider tax competition in a world with tax bases exhibiting different degrees of mobility, modeled as mobile and immobile capital. An agreement among countries not to give preferential treatment to mobile capital results in an equilibrium where mobile capital is nevertheless taxed...

In this paper, we look at corporate fiscal policies set by two competing regions in an environment where firms are heterogonous regarding to their mobility costs. We show that if regions are allow to tax domestic and foreign capital at different rates, they will offer a preferential treatment to...

This paper studies competition in of crime deterrence between jurisdictions. It considers a world such that criminals can chose the jurisdiction in which they operate. To protect its allocation, every jurisdiction invests in deterrence to reduce benefits of criminal benefits on its territory and...

This paper characterizes optimal policies in the presence of tax evasion and undocumented workers. In equilibrium, domestic workers may work exclusively in the formal sector or also in the informal sector. Surprisingly, in equilibrium, wages are always equalized between domestic and undocumented...

We consider the implications of ethical behaviour on the effect of a redistributive tax-transfer system. In choosing their labour supplies, individuals take into account whether their tax liabilities correspond to what they view as ethically acceptable. If tax liabilities are viewed as ethically...

A framework is developed in which the formation of gangs --- the criminal market structure --- is endogenous. We examine the impact of crime deterrence in this framework. It is shown that for a given gang structure, an increase in deterrence reduces criminal output. However, under identifiable...