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The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005176423
In this paper we study the relationship between unions and growth in a two-sector overlapping generations model with altruism and human capital. This relationship depends on the interaction between the technology in the sector that produces human capital, the degree of unionization of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005138821
This study analyzes the efficiency of equilibria in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides its budget among collective and particularistic goods. In order to disentangle the causes of inefficiency, we extend the model of Volden and Wiseman (Am Polit Sci Rev 101:79–92, <CitationRef...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011154742
This paper analyzes the investment decisions of the members of a committee when a subsequent bargaining process determines the distribution of a divisible good among them. The shares allocated to investing agents generate positive consumption externalities. We show that agents’ investments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116895
We analyze a rent-seeking contest that determines the bargaining protocol in a one-dimensional bargaining game, where agents preferences over social outcomes are single-peaked. We relate the incentives of agents to make unproductive and costly efforts/investments to the quota rules that are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010848199
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011037778
In the setting of a one-dimensional legislative bargaining game, we characterize qualified majority rules maximizing social surplus, that is, the sum of individual benefits. The simple majority rule maximizes social surplus when individual utilities are tent-shaped. When the utilities are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011148290
This note analyzes the efficiency properties of the equilibrium in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides a budget among collective and particularistic goods. We extend the model of Volden and Wiseman (2007) by considering smooth utility functions and consensus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835346
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of the unions' bargaining power on production and wages. In our model a competitive final good is produced from two substitutable intermediate goods. One of them is produced in a unionized unskilled sector and the other in a unionized skilled...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005447563
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005159820