We characterize asymmetric equilibria in two-stage process innovation games and show that they are prevalent in the different models of R&D technology considered in the literature. Indeed, cooperation in R&D may be accompanied by high concentration in the product market. We show that while such...

We characterize asymmetric equilibria in two-stage process innovation games and show that they are prevalent in the different models of R&D technology considered in the literature. This leads to a reassessment of the potential benefits of research cooperative agreements. Indeed, cooperation in...

The Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) introduced by <link rid="b1">Anderson and Neary (1994</link>) provided the first theoretically satisfying measure of a country's tariff structure by overcoming the problem of ad hoc specification of indexing weights and the related index number problem. We observe, however, that...

The Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) introduced by Anderson and Neary (1994) provided the first theoretically satisfying measure of a country's tariff structure by overcoming the problem of ad hoc specification of indexing weights and the related index number problem. We observe, however, that...

We show that the presumed incompatibility of uncoordinated R&D and competition is not fundamental, but hinges on the nature of R&D spillovers. As a consequence, R&D subsidies may be more effective than previously thought.

In the standard model of a rent-seeking contest, firms optimally employ resources in an attempt to win the contest and obtain the rent. Typically, it is assumed that these resources may be hired at any desired level at some fixed, exogenous per-unit cost. In many real-world rent-seeking...