Similar Search Results

Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism: Theory and Suggestive Evidence

Svitkova, Katarina; Ortmann, Andreas - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2006

particular solution of this problem, certification, where an independent agency provides a costly signal, a certificate, to … nonprofit. The assumptions of our model are derived from stylized facts that we distilled from certification systems currently … literature on certification and provides results that are different from those reported up to now. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357507

Renegotiation of Sales Contracts

Matthews, Steven A. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1993

Contracts adopted with later renegotiation in mind may take simple forms. In a principal-agent model, if renegotiation may occur after the agent chooses efforet, the principal protects against unfavorable renegotiation by "selling the project" to the agent via a sales contract. If only singleton...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766727

Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard

Matthews, Steven A. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1991

Sales contracts emerge when a principal and an agent in amoral hazard environment cannot prevent themselves from renegotiating their contract. The renegotiation occurs after the agent chooses his unobservable effort, but before its consequences are realized. Unlike previous analyses, a contract...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766769

Strategic Mismatches in Sequential Contracting: The Case of Professional Partnerships

Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999

Mismatches typically arise because of information problems in markets. This paper discusses the possibility of mismatching in partnerships focussing on strategic mismatches that cannot be explained by information problems. It is shown that due to market competition sometimes players can profit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968134

The Effect of Salvage Market on Strategic Technology Choice and Capacity Investment Decision of Firm under Demand Uncertainty

Kashefi, Mohammad Ali - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

This paper examines the effect of salvage market on strategic technology choice and capacity investment decision of two firms that compete on the amount of output they produce under demand uncertainty. A game theoretic model applies such that in the first stage firms choose their production...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257966

Solving payoff sets of perfect public equilibria: an example

Du, Chuang - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We study an example of infinitely repeated games in which symmetric duopolistic firms produce experience goods. After consuming the products, short-run consumers only observe imperfect public information about product quality. We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoff set E(δ) of firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260559

Strategic R&D with Knowledge Spillovers and Endogenous Time to Complete

Kort, Peter; Lukach, R.; Plasmans, J.E.J. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2007

It is shown that asymmetry in R&D efficiency between firms is an important factor determining feasibility of the preemption and attrition scenarios in competitive R&D with time to build. Scenarios of attrition and preemption games are most likely to occur when competitors have similar R&D...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090575

Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation : A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions

Dufwenberg, M.; Güth, W. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1997

The two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or by (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for their agents to care for sales (amounts) or evolve as sellers who care...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091056

Lifetime Employment and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Profit Maximising and Joint-Stock Firms

Ohnishi, Kazuhiro - In: Institutions and Economies (formerly known as … 6 (2014) 3, pp. 1-14

This paper investigates endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly consisting of a profit-maximising firm and a joint-stock firm. There are two stages and the firms simultaneously and independently announce in which stage they will offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment. If both firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011118417

Exit Dynamics of Start-up Firms: Does Profit Matter?

Golombek, Rolf; Raknerud, Arvid - CESifo - 2015

We estimate by means of indirect inference a structural economic model where firms’ exit and investment decisions are the solution to a discrete-continuous dynamic programming problem. In the model the exit probability depends on the current capital stock and a measure of short-run...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011124892