We study infinitely repeated games with observable actions, where players have present-biased (so-called (beta)-(delta)) preferences. We give a two-step procedure to characterize Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoffs: compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques, and use this set...

We study infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, where players have [beta]-[delta] preferences. We compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques and then characterize equilibrium payoffs. We then explore the cost of the present-time bias, producing comparative...

We study infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, where players have beta-delta preferences. We compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques and then characterize equilibrium payoffs. We then explore the cost of the present-time bias, producing comparative statics....

We introduce and solve a new class of static portfolio choice problems, where only the best realized alternative matters. A decision maker must simultaneously choose among independent ranked options, and the better alternatives have a lower chance of panning out. Each choice is costly, and just...

We introduce and solve a new class of "downward-recursive" static portfolio choice problems. An individual simultaneously chooses among ranked stochastic options, and each choice is costly. In the motivational application, just one may be exercised from those that succeed. This often emerges in...

We introduce and solve a new class of static portfolio choice problems, where only the best realized alternative matters. A decision maker must simultaneously choose among independent ranked options, and the better alternatives have a lower chance of panning out. Each choice is costly, and just...

We introduce and solve a new class of static portfolio choice problems, where only the best realized alternative matters. A decision maker must simultaneously choose among independent ranked options, and the better alternatives have a lower chance of panning out. Each choice is costly, and just...

We develop a decentralized Bayesian model of college admissions with two ranked colleges, heterogeneous students, and two realistic match frictions: students find it costly to apply to college, and college evaluations of their applications are uncertain. Students thus face a portfolio choice...