This paper explores the effect of persistence and manager ability in the decision to conduct product and process innovations. Managers make strategic decisions about the implementation of a better innovation activity in order to improve their firm’s performance in the market. Many empirical...

We provide comparative evidence on R&D tax credit and subsidy programs by studying whether firms' participation in each program exhibits state dependence and whether cross program interactions exist and are significant. We use a panel of manufacturing Spanish firms, which could use both types of...

This paper compares the R&D policy strategy of Spain and Portugal to promote business R&D, with particular attention to R&D objectives, incentives and outcomes. Despite having two of the most generous fiscal systems for R&D, their S&T indicators remain comparatively low compared with the EU...

This paper studies whether firms’ use of R&D subsidies and R&D tax incentives is correlated to two sources of underinvestment in R&D, financing constraints and appropriability. We find that financially constrained SMEs are less likely to use R&D tax credits and more likely to obtain subsidies....

We study whether firms’ actual use of R&D subsidies and tax incentives is correlated with financing constraints -internal and external- and appropriability difficulties and investigate whether both tools are substitutes. We compare the use of both policies by SMEs and by large firms and find...

This paper studies whether firms' use of R&D subsidies and R&D tax incentives are correlated to two sources of underinvestment in R&D, financing constraints and appropriability. We find that financially constrained SMEs are less likely to use R&D tax credits and more likely to obtain subsidies....

We propose a simple measure of the risk-taking incentives of the CEOs of highly levered financial institutions, levered delta, which captures the incentives to take on risk generated by CEOs' stock holdings. Using this measure, we find that stronger CEO risk-taking incentives prior to the...

We study how directors' reputational concerns influence executive compensation and the use ofcamouflaged forms of pay. We show that, in order to signal their independence to investors,boards lower managers' pay, but may also pay managers in hidden ways or structure compensationinefficiently. We...

We build a Real Options model to assess the importance of private provisionand the impact of expropriation risk on investment timing, investmentvolumes, governmental costs and social welfare. We consider two types ofbusinesses (essential and non essential businesses) and two stages (operatingand...