We construct a model with private information in which consumers write dynamic contracts with financial intermediaries. A role for money arises due to random limited participation of consumers in the financial market. Without defection constraints, a Friedman rule is optimal, the mean and...

We construct a dynamic heterogeneous-agent model with random uninsurable endowments. Two allocation mechanisms are considered, one with long-term complete credit arrangements under private information, and one with incomplete competitive markets. A role for money arises due to random limited...

We consider a random matching model where agents have complete access to each others' histories. Exchange is motivated by risk sharing given random unobservable incomes. There is capital accumulation and an endogenous interest rate. The key feature of this environment is that information is...

#abstract# We develop a credit market model with adverse selection where risk-neutral borrowers self select because lenders make use of a costly screening technology. The model has some features which are similar to the Rothschild-Stiglitz adverse selection model. If an equilibrium exists it is...

A model of dynamic risk sharing is constructed where agents meet pairwise and at random, and there is private information about endowments. Risk sharing is accomplished through dynamic contracts involving credit transactions, and through monetary exchange. A Friedman rule is optimal, and...

A banking model is constructed where roles for government- provided deposit insurance and discount window lending arise when there are restrictions on branch banking. Banks arise endogenously as an efficient arrangement for sharing risk. Discount window lending permits better risk sharing by...