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We explore the link between wealth inequality and output fluctuations in a general two-sector neoclassical growth model with endogenous labor and heterogeneous agents. When agents have homogeneous CRRA preferences and individual wealth is Pareto distributed, a sufficiently large rise in the Gini...
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The present paper is an extension of Ghiglino and Shell [7] to the case of imperfect consumer credit markets. We show that with constraints on individual credit and only anonymous (i.e., non-personalized) lump-sum taxes, strong (or “global”) irrelevance of government budget deficits is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371042
Some recent research indicates that the occurrence of indeterminacy in models with externalities may be overstated because these models ignore agents' heterogeneity. We consider a neoclassical two-sector growth model with technological externalities. Agents are heterogeneous with respect to...
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individuals care only for the propagation of their own genes, our analysis indicates that fidelity families dominate promiscuous pair bonding, in the sense that they can achieve greater survivorship and enhanced genetic fitness. The explanation lies in the free riding behavior that characterizes...
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We introduce relative concerns in the form of conspicuous consumption in a standard economic geography model a la Krugman. The keeping up with the Joneses effect brings a negative externality to some agents and gives them incentives to escape. The primary intuition is then that conspicuous...
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In the present paper we uncover a novel mechanism through which a minority can gain a disproportionate power in a perfectly functioning democracy. In our model, a government elected by majority within a two party democracy, decides on a unique redistributive instrument, the tax rate. We show...
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