This paper considers a class of two-player dynamic games in which each player controls a one-dimensional variable which we interpret as a level of cooperation. In the base model, there is an irreversibility constraint stating that this variable can never be reduced, only increased. It otherwise...

This paper integrates the distributive politics literature with the literature on decentralization by incorporating inter-regional project externalities into a standard model of distributive policy. A key finding is that the degree of uniformity (or "universalism") of the provision of regional...

This paper provides a simple but general theoretical framework for analyzing simultaneous vertical and horizontal competition in excise taxes, which includes several previous contributions as special cases. It allows for both elastic individual demand for the taxed good, and cross-border...

This paper presents a two-party dynamic model of optimal fiscal policy which integrates stabilizing electroral and partisan motives.

This paper presents a two-party dynamic model of optimal fiscal policy which integrates stabilizing electroral and partisan motives.

This note argues that when two countries choose optimal tariffs in a trade war, specific tariffs are not equivalent to ad valorem tariffs even if all markets are competitive. In particular, it shows that if a country's trading partener switches a specific tariff to an an valorem tariff that...