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We review different kinds of corruption that have been observed in procurement auctions and categorize them. We discuss means to avoid corruption, by choice of preferable auction formats, or with the help of technological tools, such as secure electronic bidding systems. Auctions that involve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005614493
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption in which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder to either lower or raise his bid, whichever is more profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785839
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer’s type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735190
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. “Steeper” securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877882
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The author presents a computer game that puts the player in the role of a central bank governor. The game is a stochastic simulation of a standard reduced form macro model, and the user interacts with this simulation by manipulating the interest rate. The problem the player faces is in many ways...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405220
Bank regulation is supposed to reduce the probability of bank failure and, if a failure occurs, to contain the damage so that system-wide problems are unlikely. The current regulatory framework, known as Basel II, is based, among other things, on risk-adjusted capital requirements. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115209
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In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956471