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This paper provides a new model of network formation that bridges the gap between the two benchmark models by Bala and Goyal, the one-way flow model, and the two-way flow model, and includes both as particular extreme cases. As in both benchmark models, in what we call an "asymmetric flow"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145666
We provide a model that bridges the gap between two benchmark models of strategic network formation: Jackson and Wolinsky' s model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal's two-way fl ow model, where links can be unilaterally formed. In the model introduced and studied here a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145667
We study the effects of institutional constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. An exogenous "societal cover" consisting of a collection of possibly overlapping subsets covering the set of players specifies the social organization in different groups or "societies". It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493838
Also published as Working Paper Ikerlanak 2003-08
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011129019
This paper analyzes the debate between Ohlin and Keynes on the question as to whether Germany was able to make the payments specified in the Dawes Plan. Keynes argued that Germany was able to collect the money but unable to transfer it to the victors because there existed an insurmountable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005518766
We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for convex games the SD-prenucleolus and the SD-prekernel coincide.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011129018
We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M stable set and otherwise they have infinite sets.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011129020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011129021