This paper extends a previous analysis by Franckx (2001). We consider an inspection game between n polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in, on the one hand, imposing the maximal...

We consider an inspection game between an arbitrary number of polluting firms and an agency who can choose to monitor ambient pollution. We obtain an equilibrium where all firms comply with the same probability and where the inspection agency inspects all firms individually if ambient pollution...

We consider the enforcement of an environmental standard if the polluters can choose between two levels of noncompliance. The probabilities of inspection are determined autonomously by an inspection agency who permanently monitors ambient pollution. We show that this monitoring creates strategic...

This paper clarifies an issue in the Hirshleifer and Rasmusen-Tsebelis controversy on the effects of penalties on crime: what is the effect of penalties if the transgression of law has a discrete nature and if the law enforcer cannot act as Stackelberg leader? We differentiate between technical...

This paper reviews the available evidence on the relevance of the Porter hypothesis for automotive emission standards. It focuses on two channels through which the Porter effect may operate. First, there is evidence that emission standards for cars have had important effects on innovation at...

We estimate a discrete-continuous model of vehicle demand and use for the Belgian region of Flanders, combining the results of the official regional travel survey with a detailed database of vehicle characteristics. The overall predictive value of the submodel predicting the number of vehicles...

A multi task principal-agent model is employed to derive optimal environmental liability rules for risk neutral managers under two alternative organizational structures - a functional organization and a product-based organization. For a product-based organization it is shown that efficiency is...

This note considers the provision of incentives in public organizations that face the following three constraints. First, no lateral entry is possible. Second, the outside opportunities of bureaucrats are independent of their performance. Third, the organization cannot design incentive schemes...