We introduce a new method of varying risk that bidders face in first-price and second-price private value auctions. We find that decreasing bidders’ risk in first-price auction reduces the degree of overbidding relative to the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash equilibrium prediction.This finding is...

We introduce a new method of varying the risk that bidders face in first-price private value auctions. We find that decreasing bidders' risk significantly reduces the degree of overbidding relative to the risk-neutral Bayesian-Nash equilibrium prediction. This implies that risk a?ects bidding...

The strong sequential core for two-stage economies with a possibly incomplete set of assets in period zero and trade in commodities in period one consists of those goods allocations that are in the classical core and moreover, after realization of the state of nature, in the core of the economy...

Based on the Expectancy Disconfirmation Model as the underlying construct, methods to measure customer satisfaction with products and the steps to be undertaken in the research process are investigated. The measurement of Derived Satisfaction using (dis)confirmation was identified to be the...

Cochrane (2007) points out that the Taylor rule parameters in New-Keynesian models are not identified, and thus trying to estimate them through single-equation regressions is pointless. This paper shows in contrast that this observation holds only for economies that do not display inflation...

We propose an approach for checking the data admissibility of non-stationary multivariate time series models (VAR or VARMA) through that of their implied individual ARIMA specifications. In particular we show that the presence of different kinds of common cyclical features restrictions, leading...

We present a model of adaptive economic agents that are k periods forward looking. Agents in our model are randomly matched to interact in finitely repeated games. They form beliefs by relying on their past experience in the same situation (after the same recent history) and then best respond to...

This paper analyzes a learning model where sophisticated market designers create new trading platforms and boundedly rational traders select among them. We ask wether "Walrasian'''' platforms, leading to efficient (market - clearing) trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If...

All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation require individual and collective judgment sets to be consistent and complete (in some recent results with completeness relaxed to deductive closure), arguably a demanding rationality requirement. They do not carry over to aggregation...

In solving judgment aggregation problems, groups often face constraints. Many decision problems can be modelled in terms the acceptance or rejection of certain propositions in a language, and constraints as propositions that the decisions should be consistent with. For example, court judgments...