We present four stylized facts about the Dot Com Era: (1) there was a widespread belief in a Get Big Fast business strategy; (2) the increase and decrease in public and private equity investment was most prominent in the internet and information technology sectors; (3) the survival rate of dot...

We examine the role of angel investors in early venture financing using a unique sample of 182 Series A preferred stock rounds. Our sample includes deals in which angels invest alone, VCs invest alone, and where both investor types co-invest. We find that deals with more angel investors have...

A novel database of business planning documents that closely approximates the population of Dot-Com entrepreneurs is introduced and used to compile three estimates: 1) the survival rate of dot-com startups, which we find is 48%; 2) the number of dot-com startups from 1998-2002, which we find to...

In a repeated game with private information, a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) can break down if communication is not necessarily simultaneous or if players can “spy” on each others’ information. An ex post perfect public equilibrium (EPPPE) is a PPE that is ex post incentive compatible...

We endogenize social network formation and collective enforcement using a model in which players interact bilaterally and repeatedly along costly links. Cooperation is supported by the threat of collective punishments that spread through the network. Optimal networks are attainable in...

This article proposes a theoretical framework for studying the invention of new products when demand is uncertain. In this framework, under general conditions, the threat of ex post entry by a competitor can deter invention ex ante. Asymmetric market power in the ex post market exacerbates the...

This paper proposes a theoretical framework for studying the invention of new products when demand is uncertain. In this framework, under general conditions, the threat of ex post entry by a competitor can deter invention ex ante. Asymmetric market power in the ex post market exacerbates the...

The game-theoretic literature on collusion has been hard pressed to explain why a cartel should engage in price wars, without resorting to either impatience, symmetry restrictions, inability to communicate, or failure to optimize. This paper introduces a new explanation that relies on none of...