We investigate optimal collusion in repeated multimarket contact under imperfect public monitoring, where two firms operate in m markets and in each market, each firmʼs decision and public signals are binary. We show that in an optimal pure strategy strongly symmetric perfect public...

This paper investigates whether multimarket contact is effective in increasing the value of collusion. We show that for any discount rate, the set of equilibrium payoffs (average per market) expands through multimarket contact in continuous-time games.

This paper analyzes repeated games in which it is possible for players to observe the other players' past actions without noise but it is costly. One's observation decision itself is not observable to the other players, and this private nature of monitoring activity makes it difficult to give...

This paper studies repeated games with private monitoring where players make optimal decisions with respect to costly monitoring activities, just as they do with respect to stage-game actions. We consider the case where each player can observe other players' current-period actions accurately...

This paper examines when a finitely repeated game with imperfect monitoring has a unique equilibrium outcome. This problem is nontrivial under imperfect monitoring, because uniqueness of stage game equilibrium does not guarantee such a negative result. We say an quilibrium is equilibrium...

We consider a repeated duopoly game where each firm privately chooses its investment in quality, and realized quality is a noisy indicator of the firm's investment. We focus on dynamic reputation equilibria, whereby consumers "discipline" a firm by switching to its rival in the case that the...

In this paper, we propose a statistical index of industrial localization based on Kullback-Leibler divergence. This index is particularly well suited to cases where industrial data is only available at the regional level. Unlike existing regional-level indices, our index can be employed to test...