The paper studies an incentive contract in a monopolistic and duopolistic credit market where borrowers are dierent in risk. One lender is in an advantaged position with respect to the other due to past relations with the borrowers. The features of the equilibrium contract are investigated. It...

The revelation principle asserts that every outcome brought by a mechanism is realized by a truthful direct mechanism. The present paper investigates the regularity conditions of these two mechanisms in the continuous space of the agent’s type. It questions what regularity condition a general...

The level of the IPO spread taken by the underwriter is a controversial issue.Some claim that the level is too high and attributes it to collusion between investment banks while others contend to the contrary. The paper examines the spread in the framework of conflicts of interests between the...

The paper studies an incentive contract in a monopolistic and duopolistic credit market where borrowers are dierent in risk. One lender is in an advantaged position with respect to the other due to past relations with the borrowers. The features of the equilibrium contract are investigated. It...

The level of the IPO spread taken by the underwriter is a controversial issue.Some claim that the level is too high and attributes it to collusion between investment banks while others contend to the contrary. The paper examines the spread in the framework of conflicts of interests between the...

The present paper studies the problem on multi-dimensional mechanisms in which the buyer’s taste and budget are his private information. The paper investigates the problem by way of a canonical mechanism in the traditional one-dimensional setting: function of one variable, the buyer’s taste....