This paper shows that one of the defining features of Walrasian equilibrium - law of one price - characterizes equilibrium in a non-Walrasian environment of (1) random trade matching without double coincidence of wants, and (2) strategic, price-setting conduct. Money is modeled as perfectly...

We investigate the efficiency property of a monetary economy with spot trade. We prove a conjecture that is essentially due to Bewley ("Models of Monetary Economics" (1980); "Econometrica" 51 (1983), 1485-504). The gist is that monetary spot trading is nearly efficient ex ante in an environment...

This paper studies the existence of single-price price equilibrium from a given initial distribution of money holdings in a search-theoretic model of money where agents have no time preference. The model is similar to the authors' recent models of search economies with no constraints on money...

In a random-matching economy of traders who maximize cumulative consumption (overtaking criterion), the stationary, Markov, Bayesian-perfect equilibrium is studied. At such equilibrium, two results hold: (1) perfect substitutability between current and future consumption implies a no-surplus...

We consider a version of Kiyotaki and Wright's monetary search model in which agents can hold arbitrary amounts of divisible money. A continuum of stationary equilibria, indexed by the aggregate real-money stock, exist with all trading occurring at a single price. There is always a maximum level...

This article concerns an infinite horizon economy where trade must occur pairwise, using a double auction mechanism, and where fiat money overcomes lack of double coincidence of wants. Traders are anonymous and lack market power. Goods are divisible and perishable, and are consumed at every...