This paper examines whether exit favours maximal or minimal differentiation within an infinite horizon supergame with discounting played by three firms. With more than two firms, the problem of which firm exits the market is similar to a coalition formation one. Solving this coalition formation...

We examine how investment possibilities by licensees and nonlicensees affect the two-part licensing contracts offered by an innovator not participating in a homogeneous good oligopolistic market. By undertaking some investments after the decision to accept or reject the licensing contract,...

This paper looks at a situation where a licensor owns a patent on a technology that allows the production of a new good. The licensor seeks to license its innovation to a set of producers that differ according to their marginal cost of producing an existing good. We show that the licensor is...

We analyze industry equilibrium and incentive to compatibility when goods produced by different producers generate utility only when consumed as component parts of a system. We assume the presence of two systems, each composed of some basic component and a set of differentiated complementary...

In this paper, two results are presented. Both refer to the impossibility theorem of Polemarchakis (1983). The Slutsky matrix of intratemporal and intertemporal substitution effects, associated with the individual short-run demand functions, is not arbitrary, but symmetric, if expectations are...