We evaluate the differential effects of Tied and Untied aid on growth, and how these effects vary with the policy environment of the recipient country. To do so, we use Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003) datasets. We find that aid effectiveness is not...

Department: Economics.

We present an experimental lab-in-the-field study on co?ee farmers in Costa Rica, to investigate the importance of real world institutions on abstract game behavior. Farmers participated in experimental public-good games with partners drawn either from their own or di?erent from their own...

Due to its long-lasting internal armed conflict, Colombia has witnessed a rupture in social networks. The network composition was altered for municipalities with high in- or out-flows of displaced individuals, in addition to the individual impact on the displaced. We use a controlled laboratory...

We design a project funding contract that provides optimal incentives to agents, in a setting where both principal and agent enjoy the benefits of the project in a non-rival form once completed but may differ in their valuation. To do so, we study optimal incentive payments in a dynamic...

We study the role of status in an experimental Principal-Agent game.Status is awarded to subjects based on either talent or luck. In each randomly matched principal-agent pair, the principal chooses the agent's status-contingent piece rate for a task in which talent matters for performance (an...

Problems related to water access and quality are significant in several countries around the world. Thus water management becomes a key issue, especially in developing countries, where the institutional and regulatory context is not always properly designed. The aim of this research is to...

We study the role of status in an experimental Principal-Agent game.Status is awarded to subjects based on either talent or luck. In each randomly matched principal-agent pair, the principal chooses the agent's status-contingent piece rate for a task in which talent matters for performance (an...

This paper models incentives and information asymmetries between the different participants in multilateral development banks' decision process, namely borrowing countries, managers and the board of governors (with borrower and non-borrower members). We propose technical cooperation requirements...