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Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution

Barbera, S.; Maschler, M.; Shalev, J. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 37 (2001) 1, pp. 40-78

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005409202

Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play.

Ferreira, J.L.; Gilboa, I.; Maschler, M. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474645

Monotonic games are spanning network games

Nouweland, C.G.A.M.; Tijs, S.H.; Maschler, M. - Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011088099

The general nucleolus and the reduced game property

Maschler, M.; Potters, J.A.M.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011089689

Monotonic games are spanning network games

van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M.; Maschler, M.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092868

A Demand Adjustment Process

Bennett, E.; Maschler, M.; Zame, W.R. - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 26 (1997) 4, pp. 423-438

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005979875

The Reactive Bargaining Set: Structure, Dynamics and Extension to NTU Games

Granot, D.; Maschler, M. - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 26 (1997) 1, pp. 75-96

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005985701

The Kernel-Nucleolus of a Standard Tree Game

Granot, D.; Maschler, M.; Owen, G.; Zhu, W.R. - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 25 (1996) 2, pp. 219-244

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005987977

Monotonic Game Are Spanning Network Games.

Van den Nouweland, A.; Maschler, M.; Tijs, S. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005660439

Voting for Voters: a Model of Electoral Evolution.

Barbera, S.; Maschler, M.; Shalev, J. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1998

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669286