This paper examines pollution regulation in a dynamic setting with complete information. We show that tradeable pollution permits may not achieve the social optimum even when the permit market is perfectly competitive. The reason is that the optimal tradeable permits regulation will typically be...

In benefit-cost analysis, it is useful to model public goods as the quality of privately consumed nonmarketed goods. This strategy is often pursued in valuing environmental amenities. The theoretical foundations of this model have not been fully developed. In this paper, comparative statics...

Benefit-cost analysis of government projects that reduce health risks over an extended period of time requires an estimate of the value of a future life. This in turn requires a discount rate. We suggest and carry out a method to estimate the discount rate using observations on discrete choices...

We study the firm's incentives to engage in research for pollution-control technologies and to adopt new technologies that it discovers or that are discovered by other firms. Licensing of discoveries is assumed possible. We also study the regulator's problem in designing optimal environmental...

This paper looks at whether a government regulator should publicly announce the amounts of pollution emitted by individual firms and plants. Disclosure may be important if there is incomplete information about firm costs, since pollution levels may be used by the regulated firm as a signal of...

(Magill, M., Quinzii, M., 2002. Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard. Journal of Mathematical Economics 38, 149-190) showed that, in a stockmarket economy with private information, the moral hazard problem may be resolved provided that a spanning overlap condition is satisfed. This...