A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N of players, there is an a priori given subset pi of coalitions of N and only coalitions in pi play an essential role. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the cores of all...

This paper provides an axiomatic model based on an extraneous random device generating objective probabilities for the derivation of expected utilities and subjective probabilities. Four basic axioms fully determine a real-valued utility function and a finitely additive subjective probability...

This paper applies the theory of the conventionally stable set to monopolistic and oligopolistic markets. A market model with a finite number of producers and a continuum of buyers is presented and then is formulated as a strategic game in which the producers' strategies are prices and the...

Let N be a finite set of players and let pi be a class of coalitions of N. We consider games with and without sidepayments such that only the coalitions in pi play essential roles but not the others. For an arbitrary pi, we get the class of all such games. The purpose of this note is to provide...