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Alternative-Move Preplays and Vn-M Stable Sets in Two Person Strategic Form Games.

Muto, S. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618540

On big boss games

Muto, S.; Nakayama, M.; Potters, J.A.M.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011087378

On cores and stable sets for fuzzy games

Tijs, S.H.; Brânzei, R.; Ishihara, S.; Muto, S. - Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011088037

Fuzzy clan games and bi-monotonic allocation rules

Tijs, S.H.; Brânzei, R.; Muto, S.; Ishihara, S.; Fukuda, E. - Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011088258

Information market games

Muto, S.; Potters, J.A.M.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011088669

Bargaining set and kernel of big boss games

Potters, J.A.M.; Muto, S.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011088840

Clan games

Potters, J.A.M.; Poos, R.; Tijs, S.H.; Muto, S. - Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011089543

Bird's tree allocations revisited

Feltkamp, V.; Tijs, S.; Muto, S. - Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011089660

Compromising in Partition Function Form Games and Cooperation in Perfect Extensive Form

Fukuda, E.; Tijs, S.H.; Brânzei, R.; Muto, S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002

In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f.game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game.For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided.Also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090485

On the irreducible core and the equal remaining obligations rule of minimum cost spanning extension problems

Feltkamp, V.; Tijs, S.H.; Muto, S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1994

Minimum cost spanning extension problems are generalizations of minimum cost spanning tree problems in which an existing network has to be extended to connect users to a source. This paper generalizes the definition of irreducible core to minimum cost spanning extension problems and introduces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090585